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FINDING MERIT IN JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS: 
NIJAC AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW JUDICIARY FOR 
NORTHERN IRELAND 
 





The post-Agreement constitutional architecture has produced a new legal space in Northern 
Ireland. While the court structure has largely endured in a recognisable format there are 
perhaps now new expectations of how it will function in the next stage of Northern Ireland’s 
transition from a society in conflict. These expectations come into focus around the nature 
and role of the judiciary that is to oversee this new legal space.  At the same time there are 
other, wider forces pressing upon the judiciary across the United Kingdom and these are 
being acted out in the various appointment commissions and regimes that have been created 
to modernise the judiciary.  This all contributes to establishing a dynamic context for 
considering whether and/or how the judiciary in Northern Ireland is changing, and the forces 
that may be conditioning any change. 
 
This chapter looks at some of the expectations that might arise for the judiciary.  It 
focuses both on some ideas about what might be the role of a judge in a transitional context, 
and the debate about how judges generally should be appointed across the United Kingdom 
where the idea of “merit” emerges as governing concept.  Next consideration is given to how 
this idea of merit plays out in the Northern Ireland context and, in particular, how it impacts 
on the appointment of women to senior judicial roles which has emerged as the central 
concern in the new dispensation.  Here the chapter draws on two pieces of research: the first 
looking at the issues surrounding judicial appointments and attitudes towards seeking such 
posts in the Northern Ireland context, and a second project where the idea of “merit” as a 
governing factor in judicial appointment was further explored (Leith et al, 2008; Leith and 
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Morison, 2013).1  Finally the chapter looks ahead at the challenges around judicial 
appointment that remain and suggests that notion of ‘merit’ has not provided the robust 
foundation which its proponents imagined it would.  
 
Post Agreement Northern Ireland: A New Legal Space 
Here the view is taken that the wider constitutional changes consequent on the Belfast 
Agreement have produced such significant changes and opened up such possibilities in the 
legal system generally that it is possible to consider this as a new legal space (Morison, 2013: 
120-44).  In part this new space has been created by a number of formal changes around 
devolution, and in particular the further devolution of justice functions (Anthony, 2011: 197-
212).  This has built upon existing structures and relationships which now, in a new context 
and with additional revisions, results in not only in the continuation of the separate formal 
jurisdiction but also a degree of “apartness” and exceptionality.  The other sense in which a 
new legal space has been created is less formal and depends on a sense that the peace process 
here as elsewhere has brought an opportunity for a new start.  Both of these must be 
considered in turn.   
 
Prior to the major engineering works on the constitution in Great Britain, that is the 
Constitution Reform Act 2005, the judiciary in Northern Ireland operated with a strong 
degree of independence. This was true for the fifty year period of devolution and during the 
time of direct rule.2  It has remained the case even after the peace process. The Northern 
Ireland Courts Service existed as a local branch of the Lord Chancellor’s Department, and 
although the Lord Chancellor was the formal head of the judiciary in Northern Ireland, a 
concordat negotiated in 1979 gave the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland and his 
                                            
 
1 The first report was titled Propensity to Apply for Judicial Office under the new Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments 
System: a qualitative study for the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission (20080 and the second Rewarding 
Merit in Judicial Appointments? (2013).   Both research reports can be accessed at www.nijac.gov.uk/index/what-we-
do/publications/research.htm. The projects were funded by the NI Judicial Appointments Commission (NIJAC).  (The 
author  served as a Commissioner with NIJAC from its inception in June 2003 until June 2012, however the views presented 
here are made in a purely private capacity and should not be attributed to the Commission.)  The author is grateful to all 
those involved in both research projects.  This includes the members of the legal profession and judiciary who contributed to 
the surveys and interviews.   It also encompasses  the wider research team composed of Professors Sally Wheeler and Brice 
Dickson, Ms Lisa Glennon, and also Dr Marie Lynch and Ben Christman who provided research assistance, as well as the 
Project Steering Groups from NIJAC which included both Commissioners and NIJAC’s Head of Diversity, Ms Adeline 
Frew.  Particular acknowledgement must be given to Professor Philip Leith who led the research teams in both projects and 
carried out an online survey in the second study.  I am grateful also to Professor Leith for his involvement in the early stages 
of drafting this chapter, although he does not wish to be a co-author on this output from the project.      
2 See the contribution in this book by K McEvoy and A Schwartz.  
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extensive office operational control over the court system locally. The Constitutional Reform 
Act formally made the Lord Chief Justice head of the judiciary in Northern Ireland and 
settled this idea of the Northern Ireland jurisdiction being not only formally separate but  also 
a place apart in the sense that it is organised and controlled locally (Gee et al forthcoming 
2015).    
The devolution of justice, made by the Department of Justice (NI) Act 2010 and the 
Northern Ireland Act 1998 (Devolution of Policing and Justice Functions) Order 2010, led to 
the establishment of the Northern Ireland Courts and Tribunals Service as an agency of the 
new Department of Justice within the Northern Ireland Executive (Northern Ireland Courts 
and Tribunals Service, 2010, 2013).  This devolution of the machinery of justice into the care 
of the local political structures was not only the last piece in the puzzle of the peace process, 
and the final stage in the formal process of devolution,  but a further recognition perhaps of a 
new chapter in the story of the legal system (Blackbourn, 2014).  Although the framework 
has changed, arguably the separateness and independence continues – although now in very 
difference circumstances of post ceasefire and economic retrenchment.    
 
Other changes to the judiciary and the courts are more qualitative. They are less clear-
cut and relate less to formal constitutional change. They impact perhaps more significantly 
on the fundamental nature and role of the judiciary in the new circumstances of a devolved 
Northern Ireland.  Such change is perhaps of a political or cultural nature, and it mirrors 
much else in the wider peace process whereby a degree of ‘creative ambiguity’ allows 
opposing political perspectives to interpret change in their own way.  For some there is a new 
legal system: an oath of allegiance to the Queen is no longer a requirement of appointment as 
QC, there is a new law officer in the shape of the Attorney General, and some of the existing 
senior appointments are distributed more widely across the political/ethnic spectrum than in 
the past.  For others there remains a degree of continuity that confirms an idea that the legal 
system served Northern Ireland well in the difficult circumstances of the past and is well 
placed to do so in the future, with only a few modifications. 
 
However these changes are interpreted, their origins lie with the Criminal Justice 
Review (CJR) launched on the foot of the Belfast Agreement (Criminal Justice Review 
Group, 1989, 2000).  Much of the impact of the CJR certainly is focused on the judiciary.  
The CJR recognised that ‘an effective and impartial judiciary is crucial to the well-being of 
any society, especially one where there have been divisions and conflict such as have been 
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experienced in Northern Ireland’ (Criminal Justice Review Group, 2000: para 6.3).  
Throughout the history of Northern Ireland the administration of justice at whatever level and 
in almost any context – like many other issues - has been capable of being seen and 
interpreted as a political or even constitutional issue (Morison and Livingstone, 1995: 
chapters 3 and 4).  The CJR acknowledged the need for manifest openness and fairness at 
every level if the court system was not to be seen as ‘owned’ and staffed by one community 
rather than the other. For those that saw the judges and the court system as inherently 
unionist it was vital that it be de-politicised while for those who did not accept this 
characterisation it was equally important that the new regime continued to establish this 
clearly.   
 
The CJR anticipated also that judges in Northern Ireland increasingly would be called 
upon to interact with executive and legislative decisions.  The Review predicted that in the 
new rights regime of the Agreement and the Human Rights Act 1998, judges would be not 
only weighing the merits of competing rights but also considering arguments about their 
economic and social impact (2000: paras 6.3-6.5). While the Review Group did not use 
language that specifically suggested that judges in the new Northern Ireland would be 
performing a different constitutional role, they did acknowledge a new constitutional reality 
whereby judges are ‘empowered to declare primary Westminster legislation incompatible …. 
[and]  set aside lesser legislation, including Acts of a Northern Ireland Assembly… [as well 
as]  determin[ing] whether individuals have been treated in accordance with Convention 
rights and whether acts of public authorities are in contravention of such rights’ (2000: para 
6.6).3  While this constitutional role would not necessarily fall to all judges, at every level, it 
was something that was new and important. 
 
Academic writers have developed more theoretical understandings of this new role, 
and assessed how this fits in with experience elsewhere.  The present author undertook an 
ESRC funded project exploring how ‘constitutional litigation’ developed in the early days of 
the settlement and how this measured up to various new understandings of constitutional 
practice and theory internationally, particularly in what might be regarded as a transitional 
                                            
 
3 In addition to ‘the Agreement cases’ discussed below, the emergence of a number of cases from the other devolved 
administrations (including Imperial Tobacco v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 61 [15] and Local Government Byelaw 
(Wales) Bill [2012] UKSC 53, [2012] 3 WLR 1294 [80]) suggesting the possibility of fundamentally new understandings 
of the sovereignty of parliament in relation to devolution indicate the prescience of the CJR’s view. 
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context (Morison and Lynch, 2007: 105-146; see also Anthony, 2009). This study considered 
how the Northern Ireland transition could be seen in terms of a range of theoretical 
understandings. For example it may be considered as an outworking of a notion of a 
constitutional revolution occurring through the agency of a particular coalition of forces 
taking control (Balkin and Levinson, 2001), or gradual processes of change and consolidation 
across dominant sets of institutions or ideology (Tushnet, 2004). Ideas of transitional 
constitutionalism too are often directly invoked. Whereas traditionally constitutionalism is 
viewed as foundational and forward looking, transitional constitutionalism looks back to 
undoing problems of the past as well as laying foundations for the future (Teitel, 2000; 
McEvoy and Morison, 2003).  It is also provisional, subject to revision, and contested, where 
the boundary between ‘ordinary’ and ‘constitutional’ politics becomes blurred.  Such a 
description may seem to have  purchase in Northern Ireland and require both a new 
constitutional practice and theory, particularly among the judiciary.  It may require judges to 
use their power creatively ‘not to “block” democracy but to make it more deliberative’, as 
Sunstein describes it (2001).  It may involve what Klare in the South African context 
describes as a ‘transformative constitutionalism’. (Klare 1998: 156).  Dorf and Sabel have an 
idea of ‘democratic experimentalism’ which involves an idea of judges working with other 
constitutional actors to develop the future (1998).  
 
All of these understandings of the Northern Ireland constitution, and the new society 
it is still in the process of creating, urge a new and very particular view of what it is that 
judges should be doing, and who they should be.  The rights basis of what is fundamentally 
an agonistic settlement  undoubtedly creates a new sort of legal space where decisions that 
are fundamental to constituting  the post Agreement society are possible at any time and from 
almost any source. 4  These ideas come in addition to wider debates about the changing nature 
of the judicial role generally in the context of a changing and globalising society (Robertson, 
2010; Mak, 2013).  They also join with the increasingly pressing concern about diversity on 
the bench and the need for modern judges to be drawn from as wide a background as 
possible.  Arguments here encompass, broadly, equal opportunities, including accessing all 
available talent; democratic legitimacy; and the potential benefits of including different 
                                            
 
4 It is characteristic of transitional societies in general that a whole range of matters are seen as central to how new societies 
are ‘constituted’ (see further Hart (2001) and the list of issues that the International Center for Transitional Justice takes 
within its remit at www.ictj.org). It is particularly the case in Northern Ireland, that almost any issue from housing to 
marching, flag flying to the siting of leisure centres is capable of being construed as a ‘constitutional’ one.  
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perspectives in the process of judging (Hale, 2001; Rackley, 2013: 501-519; Feenan, 2008: 
490-519; Hunter 2015; Cahill-O’Callaghan 2015).5  This is a general concern in the United 
Kingdom and beyond but it has particular resonance perhaps in Northern Ireland where a 
new legal culture is being formed in the post-conflict context. Here all talents are necessary 
and welcome to ensure a legal space that is led by the widest pool of judges as possible. It is 
this issue of diversity that must now be addressed.  
 
Judicial Appointments: The Search for Diversity Across the UK 
Interest in the character and background of judges in general is as intense now as at any time 
since JAG Griffiths began to publish successive editions of The Politics of the Judiciary in 
1977.6  It is possible to speculate about all sorts of reasons for this, even beyond Northern 
Ireland and its new legal space.  Some of the attention may be due to the enhanced role of 
judges generally in the UK and in public law issues in particular.  In the UK generally there 
is now increased debate over the future of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the role that 
should be given to judges (Commission on a Bill of Rights, 2012a, 2012b; Braver, 2014).  
The new Supreme Court too has alerted a wider public to the constitutional importance of 
judges and the prospect of a US style third branch of government emerging to determine 
significant aspects of public and private life.  Interest in the process by which judges are 
appointed has become intense – whether as a symptom of the wider interest in judges or 
another cause of it.   
 
The challenges facing each of the Judicial Appointments bodies that were founded 
first in Scotland in 2002, and then in Northern Ireland in 2005 and in England and Wales in 
2006, have much in common.7  However, different emphasises exist in each jurisdiction, and 
within the particular legal cultures that pertain there. The devolution context provides a 
momentum for development in Scotland (and, as has been seen, to a degree, Northern 
                                            
 
5 The arguments for a diverse judiciary, including more women, are extensively discussed, and put in a Northern Ireland 
context, by Feenan (2008: 490-519).  Feenan concludes  correctly that ‘seeing the issue only in terms of equality denies a  
much more complex field that requires understanding of the social construction of the judge, judging, and judicial 
authority, and the associated exclusion of outsider groups’ (2008: 518). 
6 The final, fifth edition of The Politics of the Judiciary (London, Fontana) was published in 2010.  
7 See the comparison of the various research projects under taken by all three bodies provided by the Judicial Appointments 
Board for Scotland (2009).  See also some further possible challenges as identified by the  House of Commons Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee, Constitutional role of the judiciary if there were a codified constitution Fourteenth 
Report of Session 2013–14 (2014) 
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Ireland).  In England and Wales (and to some extent in Scotland) the initial objective was to 
ensure an appropriate representation from women and from black and ethnic minorities, and 
there this theme has remained important.8 In Northern Ireland the focus historically was on 
recruiting a judiciary that would have the support of all sections of the community (which 
here means particularly catholic or nationalists since it was from this section of the 
population that support was historically missing).  
 
Of course imperatives evolve and change.  In Northern Ireland, the results of NIJAC’s 
annual equity monitoring reports which began in 2007,9 and the conclusions of NIJAC’s  first 
research report (Leith et al, 2008) show, perhaps surprisingly, that the religion theme was not 
generally seen as particularly problematic. In fact the appointment of women has emerged as 
the most significant feature.  Despite relatively good representation of women in the tribunal 
system and in the lower courts, the absence of a single woman in the High Court in Northern 
Ireland (at the time of writing) has proved a point of particular contention.  In all jurisdictions 
there are also issues remaining about social class – although it is generally difficult to collect 
data that can reinforce a general perception that senior judges in particular are drawn from 
within a narrow social compass.   The relatively well-worn complaint that appointments from 
the ranks of solicitors to the higher courts remains and is now joined by criticisms that 
lawyers working in the public sector are overlooked.  
 
All of these concerns are contained within appointment systems that have avoided the 
more obvious forms of social engineering such as quotas, tie-breaks or schemes of positive 
discrimination. ‘Appointment on merit’ has been the supreme governing principle and the 
pole around which all processes have circulated.10  This reflects international best practice 
                                            
 
8  The most recent Judicial Appointments Commission, Statistics Bulletin (2013) shows that while there has been a steady 
rise in the number of successful female applicants in England and Wales, the statistics for candidates from Black and 
Minority Ethnic (BAME) backgrounds have not shown any significant improvement on previous periods. Although the 
Scottish Judicial Appointments Board does not publish statistics about the background of applicants it does have a 
diversity remit and continues to monitor applications.  It has conducted research on diversity issues, although this does not 
seem to be on-going (see the perhaps rather worryingly titled Diversity Group Final Report 2010). 
9  eight years of reports can be found at www.nijac.gov.uk/index/what-we-do/publications/research.htm.  
10 See, for example, Lord Falconer’s foreword to the initial consultation paper ‘Constitutional Reform: A New way of 
appointing Judges’ (Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2003) where he insists that ‘of course the fundamental 
principle in appointing judges is and must remain selection on merit.’ (p.5).  See also the response to the consultation by 
the Judges Council (available at.www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/).  Here the Judges’ Council maintains that that 
‘The reputation of our judiciary rests on the fact that it has predominantly been recruited from practising members of the 
legal profession ….and the fact that all appointments have been based purely on merit’ (para 69) and ‘the overriding 
requirement for any appointment body that the best candidates be appointed on merit’ (para 80). 
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and a whole series of international declarations.11  Every jurisdiction within the UK has 
enshrined this in legislation.12   In the Republic of Ireland a high level review of judicial 
appointments, led by the Chief Justice has recommended that the merit principle be put into 
law there too (Judicial Appointments Review Committee, 2014). 
 
It is interesting however that the initial near universal support for new processes, and 
for the merit principle, is now beginning to fracture.  Even among the legal profession (where 
merit was initially thought to be essential to ensure their support) and with others who might 
be thought to have an interest in the wider policy aims of providing a transparent process, 
there are some who now take a hostile view of the processes, and the concept of merit has 
been at the centre of this revolt.  Recently the voices of dissent have become louder and 
divisions have appeared within the senior legal profession and judiciary itself.  
 
Lord Sumption, a former England and Wales Judicial Appointments Commissioner, 
on his appointment to the Supreme Court, gave a lecture to the Law Society in which he 
argued that the pool for appointment of judges is ‘dominated by white males’ (2012).  For 
Sumption an important part of the problem is the issue of merit.  Although appointment on 
merit is essential to retain the quality and attractiveness of the bench to the best candidates, it 
does not, in his view, allow selection with a view to altering the make-up of the judiciary as a 
whole.  The result of this, he argues, is that in the absence of positive discrimination (to 
which he is opposed) it will take at least fifty years to achieve even ‘a reasonably diverse 
judiciary’.  It appears that ‘merit’ in Sumption’s view currently lies – for whatever reason – 
with white males. 
 
 Lord Hacking, a leading practitioner, has taken issue with how merit is measured by the 
JAC, particularly through its lay membership.  He claims that the lay commissioners cannot 
                                            
 
11 See, for example, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and 
endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 
November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985; Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Council of Europe’s Committee 
of Ministers on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges (see     
www.wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=524871&Site=CM;  and the Venice Commission (2010). 
12 In England and Wales S. 63(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides that ‘selection must be solely on merit’. In 
Northern Ireland, S. 5(8) of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002, as amended by the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 
2004 provides that ‘the selection of a person to be appointed, or recommended for appointment, to a listed judicial office 
(whether initially or after reconsideration) must be made solely on the basis of merit’. In Scotland, S. 12 of the Judiciary 




have the benefit of knowing each candidate closely from years of working together in legal 
practice.  Hacking, maintains that he is reflecting the dismay of the wider legal profession as 
he complains about the Judicial Appointments Commission approach to merit and the 
‘humiliating’ role of ‘rigorous essay writing, formal presentations and two lengthy formal 
interviews’ in finding a new Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales (2013: 27). This 
insider perspective offers an interesting viewpoint and it is one that sees merit as something 
that is clear and demonstrable – but only to those in the know. 
  
A counter to these has been Lady Hale who in a recent speech has suggested that ‘as 
some of us have always known, it is not enough to get the appointments process right, though 
that is hard enough. We have to get the definition and assessment of merit right too and that 
is much harder’ (2013).  Unfortunately, Hale does not provide a view of just what any 
definition of merit should be except to suggest that it should not necessarily include high 
quality advocacy. 
 
Jack Straw, former Lord Chancellor and Minister of Justice, also sees merit as of 
central importance.  He takes issue directly with Sumption’s idea that merit and diversity are 
in some way to be seen as mutually exclusive and pitted in opposition to each other (2013: 
67).  Reflecting on the introduction of the current appointments system, Straw maintains that 
it may have been naïve to believe that if the system were changed then outcomes would be 
different.  Importantly, however, he does not see the problem as being about how merit is 
created and operationalized.  Straw recognises that ‘merit is an empty vessel which needs 
careful filling: merit can too easily mean “people like us”’ (2013: 71) (which follows perhaps 
the Hacking view).  Indeed, Straw continues, ‘appointing “on merit” does not necessarily 
result in the most meritorious, or best, candidates being appointed.’ There are, he argues, 
several possible reasons for this:  it may be because the best candidates are not applying; or 
because something is going wrong in the process.  Alternatively, it may be ‘because merit has 
been wrongly defined’.  Straw derides the idea of an unrealistic, illusory concept of merit – a 
league table of brilliance - which is always perfectly distinct and measurable.   This is a view 
with which it is possible to concur enthusiastically.  However Straw then goes on to develop 
an argument for increasing diversity that rather undermines this important insight and 
demonstrates perhaps the limits of ‘solely on merit’ approach.  He suggests that faced with 
two equally meritorious candidates in a tie-break situation it may sometimes be necessary to 
achieve a balanced judiciary to favour a candidate from an under-represented group.  This is 
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all very well but it hardly offers a route to a more balanced judiciary. More importantly, 
however, it begs the question of what is actually meant by ‘equally meritorious’?  That in 
itself suggests that there is some way in which merit can be scored in an absolute manner, 
and certainly does not provide an alternative view of what might constitute merit.   
 
The diverse views on merit from a range of ‘insiders’ reveals the centrality of the 
concept to judicial appointments and how it acts as a lightning rod for a wide variety of other 
concerns. It is however Lady Hale and Jack Straw’s initial insight about the very nature of 
merit that resonates most with the views that the research uncovered in Northern Ireland. 
However here the problem is not only about finer judgements of merit, and the possibilities 
of bringing in diversity among the equally meritorious, but about how the very idea is created 
by a case based system, conditioned by experience at the bar, determined by seniority and 
maleness, and policed by a judiciary who may see meritorious candidates looking as much 
like themselves as possible. As shall be discussed now, there exists very real scepticism 
about how merit is defined and used in the appointments process. This is particularly 
widespread within female perspectives inside the legal profession, and it is here that its 
impact is most obviously marked.  This must cause some concern as we move forward 
towards establishing a judiciary appropriate for the new circumstances in Northern Ireland. 
 
What Does ‘Merit’ Mean in Northern Ireland? 
It is known that women do not do well in the higher judicial appointment competitions even 
though they are often well qualified.13 It is known also that ‘merit’ is something that most 
insiders agree is an essential requirement for judicial appointment, although there are some 
serious concerns about how it is working.14 In the second of two pieces of research 
undertaken for the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission15 the focus was 
placed particularly on testing through quantitative and qualitative methods whether ‘merit’ as 
                                            
 
13 It is not just in UK that the problem whereby the higher levels of judicial office are dominated by male office holders is 
particularly found.  This has been discussed by Cheryl Thomas, where she comments that ‘… recent research by the 
European Social Affairs Commission, which showed that women clearly succeed in gaining judicial appointments where 
competitions are anonymous and the criteria for appointment are knowledge based, not experience based. The data in Italy 
(and France) bear this out. Sixty percent (60%) of successful applicants to the Italian judiciary are women for entry-level 
competitions that are purely knowledge-based and almost completely anonymous. However, after entry women find 
progression to the senior ranks, where appointment is increasingly experience and seniority based, extremely difficult. 
Only 7.9% of all senior judicial positions in Italy are held by women’ (2005: 67; see also Thornton, 2007). 
14 For further discussion on this see the list of senior figures decrying the current situation in the UK provided by Rackley 
(2013: 501-502). 
15 See n. 1 above for full details.  
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presently understood is in fact the cause of these problems. This project was thus designed to 
elicit views on the nature of ‘merit’; how it is perceived and how it might be changing. The 
project used both an on-line survey with a variety of vignettes or stories to elicit views from 
respondents, and a more traditional series of interviews and focus groups.  The findings 
which relate particularly to merit can be enunciated quite briefly: 
 
1.  Merit – in the sense of having the qualities needed for being a good judge - was often 
defined by respondents more widely than meaning simple technical legal expertise 
combined with court experience at the higher level.  Frequent mention was made of 
qualities of empathy and judgement, case management, good listening skills and 
experience as well as problem-solving.  
 
2. There was a general view that merit in this sense could be found in non-traditional 
candidates and judicial appointments could and should be made from a broad range of 
individuals where this idea of merit could be found in.    
 
3. The current view of merit used in the appointments process was quite widely seen as 
based on qualities mainly possessed by the bar, and to be based on seniority and 
experience of advocacy in court.  Judges were thought to reinforce this view of merit 
and ensure its dominance in the appointment process. Women generally believed 
themselves less likely to be seen as having this sort of merit or indeed have the 
opportunities to gain it.  
 
4. There were very considerable differences in attitude between male and female 
respondents, particularly in regard to the nature of merit required for the High Court. 
Women respondents were generally much more favourable to non-traditional 
backgrounds being seen as meritorious.  
 
5. While barristers were most likely to see merit in traditional terms, there was a 
significant number who acknowledged the wider view of merit.    
 
6. The more encompassing view of what constitutes merit was widespread among 
solicitors and, particularly, lawyers in public service. 
 
7. While there was some recognition that lower courts and tribunals were beginning to 
accommodate a wider range of talent, there was generally a considerable amount of 
scepticism that merit is being rewarded at the High Court appointment level, and this 
was seen as a particular problem.    
 
Although the project was undertaken in Northern Ireland there is little reason to believe 
that many of the findings on gender are not relevant to other jurisdictions.16  
 
                                            
 




The Research Study Findings  
The NIJAC study on merit has two elements.  The first involved an online survey where six 
vignettes were created to highlighted issues of gender, age, familiarity to senior judges, part-
time working, solicitor-barrister division, type of practice, and family responsibility which 
might be thought relevant to appointment to judicial posts.  (See further Leith and Morison 
2013 and Leith 2013). Overall those responding to the survey seemed prepared to see merit 
in a wider sense than often is traditional in the appointments process.  Although there were 
degrees of conservatism from many who answered the survey, particularly over age and 
status, female respondents were more favourable towards non-traditional candidates than 
were men.  There were however many who felt that meritorious candidates may not be 
recognised within the system as it operates presently but that this is not necessarily the fault 
of NIJAC processes as such but rather a failing of the wider legal system which sustains the 
current view of merit.  
 
The second element of the research – and the one upon which this account 
concentrates – relates to series of interviews and focus groups that was carried out by the 
author with individual practitioners from both branches of the professions at various levels of 
seniority.  There were some women only focus groups and focus groups drawn from lawyers 
working in the public sector.  In all about sixty individuals took part. Generally the views 
elicited from the scenarios were confirmed in the focus groups.  Merit was seen generally as 
more than simple technical legal knowledge.  As one barrister expressed it, ‘knowing the law 
is just the start  ... the merit principle needs to be broadly defined to include a wider range of 
skills, and disentangled from experience in the traditional sense.’  
 
There was however considerable variation expressed as to what exactly merit might 
mean and how it could be evidenced.  For some, this was clearly related to the sort of work 
that an individual might have before appointment. Often focus group respondents, 
particularly from the bar, took the view that a mixed, high-end practice provided the best 
basis to demonstrate merit.  Criminal law was mentioned frequently as important and so too 
was judicial review and high value chancery work which was thought to provide an 
opportunity to demonstrate the requisite attributes. However, this linking of merit to 
particular kinds of work was not universally held.  It was suggested that complexity and 
difficulty might be found in all sorts of areas of law. As one barrister saw it, ‘anyone dealing 
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with children’s cases, freeing orders …  social security cases are the hardest cases that I read, 
dealing with really complex law ... chancery cases … anyone who can do that has the 
intellectual ability to do the job [of a judge] – provided they are given the training in 
evidence and so forth’.   
 
If an applicant’s case load were mainly in the High Court with occasional visits to the 
Court of Appeal or even the Supreme Court or Strasbourg this too was seen as significant.  
As a barrister pointed out, ‘how else do you demonstrate merit except if you can do the more 
difficult cases?..’.  In part this seems to be because the standard of practice is generally 
agreed to be higher in the higher courts.  As one relatively new QC put it, ‘You do learn from 
higher level courts ... everyone gets better, you get better, the questions get harder ... and you 
learn about how to behave in court’.  
 
This view was, however, far from universal, and indeed respondents not from the bar, 
tended to express doubts about the extent to which specific sorts of cases in particular courts 
demonstrated merit as opposed to some sort of prestige.  It was in fact a senior barrister who 
told us, ‘It’s about kudos ... often high value cases are straightforward, easy, they can be a 
penalty kick ... and murder is not the most complex crime ... it is not depth or quality it is 
about kudos’. This view was supported enthusiastically by a  public sector lawyer who 
expressed the view that ‘if you can handle ... industrial tribunal cases ... equal value ... 
indirect discrimination you can handle anything that is likely to come up in the High Court  
…  you would be very unlucky in the high court to come up against anything as complex’.  
Similarly social welfare law was mentioned as a complex area where skills developed there 
would be transferable to a senior court appointment, although generally it was not thought  to 
be  seen as such.   
 
Merit and the Bar 
The interviewees generally agreed that merit is more likely to be seen as existing within a bar 
practice. This view was not unique to barristers but also noted in a more critical way by those 
not at the bar. Indeed a solicitor at partner level expressed the view that ‘the solicitors’ 
profession is at the bottom and people want to keep them there’.   From the barristers’ 
perspective, however, it was felt that the high profile of court work brought particular value, 
and showed merit very clearly.  As one moderately senior barrister put it, ‘our skills are as 
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advocates... if you have cross-examined witnesses on a day and daily basis this is an 
appropriate skill for a judge.’  Another barrister went further in seeing the importance of 
advocacy for judicial office saying ‘you need to have experience with advocacy so you can 
see when the wool is being pulled over your eyes’.  Indeed generally experience of court 
work over a sustained period of time and at a reasonably high level was felt, particularly by 
some barristers, to be the most effective – if not indeed the sole - way of demonstrating merit 
for judicial office. This experience was seen (by some barristers) to be unique to the bar and 
it meant that identifying merit was relatively straightforward.  As one barrister put it simply, 
‘the most successful practitioners are the most successful judges. They have demonstrated 
that they know the law.... and get on with colleagues ... and if females have got on despite the 
obstacles [then they too must have merit].’ 
 
However, it would be inaccurate to see this view of merit as being bar-oriented as 
universal to barristers. The more senior bar appeared more willing than juniors to find merit 
beyond their ranks. One senior barrister told us, ‘There are two examples of judges ... who 
have come from the solicitors’ profession and they are excellent judges’. However the same 
respondent went on to say, ‘but the bar think that we have a particular set of skills that make 
us good judges ... our skills are more transferable’.  This view was expressed more 
trenchantly by younger barristers with one in a focus group insisting, ‘There is a difference 
between a barrister and a solicitor ... they [solicitors] routinely sit behind the junior and 
senior counsel ... they have all sorts of opinions but they don’t have to ask the questions, put 
themselves on the line’.  While it may not be entirely clear how this translates into the 
judicial role, barristers generally did represent their work as closer to that of the judge than 
other lawyers. 
 
Of course there are consequences to such a view and those (particularly non-barristers) 
who did not share the bar-orientation were fully alive to them.  One of these is that a bar-
oriented focus on merit meant that other important skills were being overlooked.  A solicitor 
said: 
Some [barristers] are very good at paperwork, at drafting an opinion or the black 
and white letter of the law but that doesn’t necessarily translate to them being 
good in a court situation, having to weigh up pros and cons, deal with the people 
in front of you and decide if someone is credible or not. 
 
It was a moderately experienced public sector lawyer who expressed the view that: 
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A fairly homogeno group are describing themselves to themselves, and, although 
you have a fair and transparent appointment process, the way in which a candidate 
is described will favour someone who has a traditional, mixed private practice ...  
if you go into any public voluntary or public sector [body] you find people are 
doing things that are very different ... and yet you will be exercising very relevant 
skills.   
 
Indeed it may be that not all skills relevant for judicial appointment are developed in a 
private practice at the bar, and that to see it in this way misses other important attributes. As a 
partner in a firm of solicitors remarked: ‘A lot of them are good advocates but that doesn’t 
make them a good judge ... a good judge is the opposite, not a spin doctor ...’.  Another 
public sector lawyer pointed out that: ‘the judicial skill set and the private practice skill set 
are not necessarily exactly the same. You need things that people from non-traditional 
backgrounds can bring ... case management, managing staff ... you need people who have 
these skills’.  
 
Merit and Seniority  
There was a also a view that merit was most likely to be found with senior practitioners – 
those with many more years of experience than the formal requirement for most judicial 
posts.  This view was fairly widely held but seemed particularly prevalent among barristers.  
Indeed it was a senior barrister who said: 
 We need the very best people who have dealt with high value cases, been to the 
Court of Appeal, Strasbourg, dealt with difficult and complex cases and only if 
you have done this are you really good enough to demonstrate the sorts of skills 
[for the High Court].   
 
This view, that experience often far in excess of the minimum required is important, 
reinforced the idea of a ‘pecking order’ for judicial appointment that was discovered in the 
earlier research (Leith et al, 2008: 13-14 and 97-98). Here again the idea emerged that the bar 
(mainly) but the legal profession in general, would have some idea of who was ‘worthy’ and 
who should be next on the bench.   For example, an interviewee said, ‘there would have been 
quite a bit of disapproval if [XX] hadn’t got it ... There are appointments that are seen as 
surprising because the bar know how those people perform in court but the judicial 
appointments commission can’t’.  Views of this sort also tied into more general criticisms 
that ‘outside’ bodies could not be expected to be alive to the pecking order.  For example, the 
view was expressed that ‘competence based [appointment] works in England and Wales 
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where there are a lot of people ... but we are still a small enough jurisdiction, and people 
know each other and know their reputation’.17 
 
There were of course other views.  Many of those interviewed were willing (at least in 
theory) to look for merit where it could be found.  As one barrister said: 
Does experience equate with age?  … I know people who have done 12 or 13 
years of work at the very highest level and others who have been pootering around 
for 25 years and more and will never do the same level of work.   
 
Others confirmed that it is the nature and quality of work that which is important, and this is 
not the same as simple length of service: it may be possible to obtain sufficient experience of 
work at the appropriate quality in a short period.  There were several respondents who were 
very aware of the consequences of equating merit with seniority.  As one senior practitioner 
put it, ‘there are no High Court judges who are work-shy but there is an expectation that you 
are going to work harder in your sixties than you did even in your twenties that is unusual’. 
This was felt to narrow the applicant pool to those who maintained an energy and enthusiasm 
about continuing the long hours, hard work culture that had put them in the position where 
they may be seen as meritorious.  It was also seen as potentially limiting the pool yet further 
as it was felt by some that such a decision about extending one’s active working life may 
well be one that men would find easier to take than women for a whole host of reasons 
relating to caring responsibilities and life patterns.  It was in fact a senior male barrister who 
made the point  that: 
 If you become a high court judge in your late fifties you are probably thinking 
about working until you’re seventy ... if you are a man you would find it easier to 
make a decision about working on in a high pressure job until you are seventy.  
 
Merit as Male  
Of course this view that merit may most often be associated (at least by some people) with 
practice at the bar, with a particular sort of caseload and obtainable only with a degree of 
experience has other consequences too.  The view was expressed that women were less likely 
to be able to offer merit of this sort.  Frequently it was mentioned how difficult it is for 
women to avoid being channelled into family work.  Respondents expressed a divergence of 
view as to whether the necessary experience could be attained in family law as opposed to 
                                            
 




other sorts of work.  However many respondents did take the view that this channelling of 
women into family law, and the uncertain status of the skill sets there, has the consequence 
that any merit that may be displayed there is likely to be overlooked in favour of other forms 
of merit that can be observed more easily in more ‘mainstream’ work.  For some respondents 
this was a result of the nature of the work. As one respondent put it, ‘there’s not a lot of law 
in family law’ echoing the view found in the earlier research about the status often accorded 
to ‘chick law’ (Leith et al, 2008: 23, 56 and 61). However other interviewees took the view 
that there was rather a different skill set, and it was one that was just as valuable in 
evidencing merit for judicial appointment.  For example, a QC who practiced only rarely in 
the family court reported an experience of seeing a female barrister in action: ‘I was in court 
and was blown away by her advocacy skills but judges don’t see her ... I thought it was a lot 
more difficult ... a very limited number of judges see them... and they are held in private’.   
 
Indeed, the view was expressed quite strongly that this pigeon-holing of women 
combined with the way in which merit is seen may have the effect that it is difficult for 
women to present themselves as having the same degree of merit.  As one interviewee said, 
‘if you have criminal experience, that is the gold standard... family law experience is not 
what is wanted ... and the vast majority of those, barristers and solicitors who practice 
criminal law are male,  and there you are...’.  Indeed female respondents, as well as some 
males, were very keen to make the point that generally female merit is something different, 
and does not  seem to be transferable.  As member of one focus group put it, ‘the requirement 
to succeed is that you must think just like a man, you must act like a man ... be as good as a 
man’. 
 
Some of female respondents were anxious to report that it is often particularly difficult 
for women to emulate this male model of merit.  There are wider factors which may make it 
more difficult for women to progress in the same way.  These include not only the diversion 
of women into family law specialisms and sexist briefing patterns at the bar but also some 
structural factors.  There was a view expressed by female respondents, and not generally 
contradicted by male respondents, that men were better able to pursue the informal networks 
that can lead to success.  For example, on focus group respondent said: 
men can stay on here [the bar library] and then go home to a cooked dinner, the 
kids in bed,  and go straight into the study... they can hang around here ... do their 
work in the library ... networking in a an informal way  ... they can run into 




In contrast women talked of the difficulties of managing careers and families. As one female 
barrister put it, ‘…  I have watched my male peers at the bar advance far beyond me... they 
have good wives at home’.  There was general agreement that a lot more networking goes on 
among male practitioners, particularly at the bar:   ‘… [I]t’s not what you know, it’s very 
much the golf and the rugby’.  
 
There is, however, a view that this may be changing – albeit at a very slow pace.  
There was some mention of the feminization of the legal professions at the lower levels but 
also something about the emergence of a cohort of women lawyers who are more ambitious 
than their predecessors.  It was also thought that the general move to specialism in legal 
practice may in fact facilitate this development. However, even the most enthusiastic heralds 
of change of this sort recognised this as both a very uncertain and long term process, and as a 
reaction to the continuing male dominance of the legal profession rather than a more 
fundamental change in its nature.  As one interviewee expressed it, ‘the women are adopting 
a male way of succeeding  ... but the system, the way of succeeding, needs to be changed’. 
 
Merit Policed by Judges 
The idea of merit being bar-influenced and in large part male is conditioned and reinforced, 
according to many of interviewees, by the role that they see the existing judges playing as 
gatekeepers to judicial appointment.  As one barrister respondent reported,  
those on the bench see the skill sets they bring as being the ones that are needed  .. 
it is an advocacy skill set by and large. .. Judges have the view that the profile we 
[barristers] have represents what a good judge is.  
 
From the perspective of some barristers this was not a problem.  Indeed, it may be seen as 
good thing – particularly if the view of merit being bar focused is accepted.  However 
solicitors in particular often expressed the view that their skills were being overlooked 
because the judges controlled the idea of merit and viewed it in relation to barristers’ skills. 
There may even be wider considerations at play reflecting the perceived status of the two 
branches of the profession. It was in fact a barrister who made the comment ‘How the 
judiciary address solicitors in courts compared to how they address barristers, particularly 




Many see the existing judiciary playing an undue role in determining appointments. 
This is indirect, in terms of validating certain understandings of merit, and even sometimes 
more direct.  It was a solicitor who reflected a fairly common view of the consultee or referee 
process involving the existing High Court bench that is required for some senior posts when 
he commented that: 
The High Court still have their black balling, if I can put it like that ... all 
applicants have to be known to people on the High Court either personally or 
professionally ... whenever you have that criteria –  that discriminatory criteria – it 
sends out huge signals that we want to keep it to ourselves or pull up the 
drawbridge when we have the right people on our side.  
 
The processes and indeed structures of NIJAC, including alternative consultee arrangements 
and the presence of the lay commissions, were treated with varying degrees of scepticism.  
One respondent asked, ‘Do all the commissioners carry equal weight? Do the judicial 
commissioners have more say? Can they say he appeared in front of me last week and he’s 
no good?’   Another expressed a more unequivocal view: ‘NIJAC doesn’t work:  it is a front, 
there is still a tap on the shoulder approach’. 
 
The High Court – and the Absence of a Woman in the High Court - as a Focus for Concern 
Although this research was interested in the range of judicial appointments it was 
immediately fairly clear that the position in the High Court established the tone for the whole 
judicial appointments system. When it was mentioned to respondents that the balance of men 
and women was moderately healthy in proportion to the applicant pool in some of the lower 
courts and tribunals this was sometimes dismissed.  As one respondent said, ‘a lot of people 
don’t consider …. those to be judicial offices .... lower down the judicial ladder it is easier 
[but]  the High Court sets the scene’.  Another solicitor respondent put the situation more 
directly:  
You just have to look at the High Court. They perpetuate themselves, they just want 
more of them up there. They don’t want diversity. You only have to go along to a 
function with High Court judges and they are all there in their dark grey suits ... no 
women sends out the wrong signals. 
 
Indeed it was the absence of women in the High Court (at the time of the research) that 
coloured all conversations about merit at every level in the judiciary.  It would be difficult to 
exaggerate the significance that is attached to the absence of a woman judge in the High 
Court which remains the case up to the middle of 2015.  Unfavourable comparisons were 
frequently made with the Republic of Ireland with more than one respondent pointing out 
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that Northern Ireland is many years behind its neighbour in this regard.18  There was however 
a general recognition that this absence of female High Court judges was an intricate issue 
which required a complex solution.  As a senior barrister put it: 
 Self-evidently the problem is that there are no women on the High Court bench 
but if you are just trying to design a process that is going to [appoint a women to 
the high court] for its own sake, how is this going to be a good process?  
 
Fear of a tokenistic appointment was wide-spread. Some respondents recognised the problem 
as far-reaching.  It was said: 
Until more women advance in the profession, both branches of the profession, you 
will not see a woman in the High Court .... there is a lack of assistance to women 
to succeed in the legal profession ... we need something more general and 
systemic ... it can’t be left to the endeavours of some one individual.  
 
There was considerable speculation in the conversations about what sort of individual 
might be the first to take the role.   A female barrister made the observation that,  
the last thing any women wants is to lead the charge ... because we all know what 
will be said - “You are only there because of your gender” and that would be a 
nightmare to work through. We all know it is said of women judges on the bench 
now. 
 
A fairly common theme, particularly among female respondents, was one which 
stressed the challenges of being the first female in this role.  Mention was made of ‘the 
considerable chill factor of going into a club of 14 or 15 men’. Another respondent said that 
the ‘... the back corridor can be seen as a very special sort of club  ... and that club 
atmosphere might very well put off anyone who is not an iconoclast from applying’.  One 
thought from a female barrister was that ‘maybe we would need to have two or three 
appointed at the same time’ to overcome the perceived difficulties. However there was a 
view strongly expressed, particularly among female respondents at the bar that such a 
candidate could and would be found.  For example, one interviewee said: ‘She exists ...the 
High Court bench is not full of dinosaurs. There are many High Court judges would more 
than welcome a woman colleague, and would be welcoming and supportive’. 
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 Judicial Pathways – Formal and Informal 
The existence of a formal career path that might lead to appointment at the higher level was 
not something that the research was able to uncover to any great degree.19 There was mention 
of a few individuals who, it was reported, seemed to have taken on judicial office at a 
relatively junior level but who were thought to have further ambitions.  However this was not 
seen as a universally available career option, although it was suggested that it might be a 
good thing in that it, ‘would allow a wider range of people to demonstrate the appropriate 
competencies....[as] the part-time roles have the potential to do this’. As one focus group 
member put it, ‘If you shine in one tier you should have the opportunity to move up’.  It was 
thought that this possibility might even encourage good applicants who would not otherwise 
think of a judicial career.  A senior lawyer from the public sector made the point that, ‘a 
judicial pathway is the key thing ... I work in a sector where there are some extremely capable 
women but who have no perception of the possibility to be a part-time judge’. The creation of 
this possibility was felt to be an important attraction.  Indeed this was seen by some as the 
best possibility of securing a female appointment in to the High Court.  It was said that, 
‘women have taken the route of ... coming up through the tiers, from other judicial jobs’ and 
that, ‘there are a large number of female applicants in the County Court who may well be 
where the next High Court judge comes [from]’.  Indeed there was a view expressed widely 
that a series of appointments, moving up through the tiers of the judiciary to the County 
Court, might be thought to be an appropriate proving ground, and perhaps of at least equal 
validity to a career in the bar. As one respondent put it,  
merit has to be real merit ... but if someone is a solicitor, a female in family work 
west of the Bann... they need a place to show that they can do the hard work, It is 
the County Court that is the place. They can progress from there. 
 
Although the idea of a formal pathway to a judicial career that might take a judge up 
the rungs of the career ladder remains an uncertain although interesting possibility there was 
very little doubt among informants about the existence of an informal pathway to judicial 
preferment.  It was widely reported in all the focus groups that there were a number of 
important attributes and career choices that were likely to have been made in order for a 
                                            
 
19 ‘Judicial Career’ is a concept which appears as Recommendation 44 of the ’Report of the Advisory Panel on Judicial 
Diversity 2010’ in England and Wales: ‘The concept of a judicial career is key to achieving progress on a more diverse 
judiciary…This means identifying clearer career paths so that those considering joining the judiciary understand their 
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candidate to appear meritorious.  These were widely and easily recognised by  informants. As 
one interviewee remarked that “it is funny how, irrespective of the existence of NIJAC, there 
are certain truths that are self-evident ... senior crown council will become a judge”. When 
pressed further on what this informal track might involve it was said, “you have access to the 
right sort of work … if you’re known in the back corridor, if you’re Treasury Counsel,   if 
your father was a judge ...”.  Another informant characterized a successful candidate as 
someone who may well have been “vocal on the bar council or served on it ... very high 
profile, everyone would have heard of them”.  Much of this idea of a career pathway was 
seen to be about networking and making the correct contacts, and much seemed to exclude 
women for structural reasons.  
 
Various events including dinners and lectures were thought to be important.  It was 
here that the necessary impressions can be made and the important contacts fostered. As one 
informant put it, “the person who has played at that level is going to have an advantage ... 
you have access to the right sort of work” and, crucially, “you know the judges”.  This latter 
element - connections with the senior judiciary - is seen as particularly important, mainly in 
relation to access to appropriate consultees or referees.   This was believed by some 
respondents  to be a feature that impacts particularly on women.  Women reported 
themselves to be less likely to network and less willing to ask judges for support.  
 
It was felt that these informal career pathways are taken at a very early stage.  As one young 
practitioner said, “It would be naive to say there are no pathways... if you look into any year 
group you can see that for some people the path is laid out before them, the connections are 
there”.  The existence of these pathways was thought to be common knowledge: an 
interviewee said,  “of course that goes on, there is evidence of that.  Everybody knows 
that...”.  (Indeed selection to the QC panel was mentioned frequently as being subject to a 
similar process, and here too a belief in informal pathways as significant was widely and 
firmly held.) The existence of this informal career path was not seen as providing the most 
open and accessible route to judicial office and it was felt to miss talent – particularly among 
women - who may not have chosen or been able to negotiate a way to the glittering prizes.  
As one informant put it, “NIJAC has been looking for other experiences, outside of work, so 
that flies in the face of what they are trying to do .... People who are on the inside track know 
how to fill in the form, know the buzz words... but others don’t”. There was a feeling 
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reported that relying on judicial insiders reporting on those that are known to them had the 
effect that experiences outside the informal career pathway were undervalued. 
 
Conclusion: What Might Scepticism about Merit Mean for New Legal Spaces? 
 
It is clear then that the legal profession as a whole is not entirely at ease with the present 
system for appointing judges, or perhaps more accurately it is not fully convinced that the 
appointments process is yet yielding the sort of judiciary that many would like, especially in 
the new circumstances that pertain in Northern Ireland.  In particular there is concern that 
women are not being appointed to the highest level and this colours perceptions of the whole 
system. This feeling is fed by a notion that ‘merit’ can and should be seen in a wider context 
than it has been traditionally. Women – the group who suffer most from the present 
construction of merit – are, it was found, very much more liable to see the idea of merit in 
this wider manner than men (and public service lawyers and solicitors more likely to have 
this view than barristers, irrespective of gender).   
 
These findings in terms of the socially constructed nature of merit are hardly novel. 
For example, it is a commonplace amongst researchers into judicial appointments that merit 
is a social construct and what constitutes merit is defined by relatively small elites.  For 
example, Malleson has explored this where she notes that merit has been constructed around 
the needs of ‘certain preferred groups in a way which has unfairly advantaged them’ (2006: 
136).  In an argument that is very familiar within feminist approaches it can be maintained 
that this idea of merit, while posing as neutral, is in reality a strongly gendered concept.20  
The argument is that this concept of ‘merit’, and the method for assessing it, is at the heart of 
the failure of many women (not only in law but in many sectors of society) to advance to the 
upper reaches of professional life.  This is not of course because women are not meritorious, 
but simply that merit is identified in a way which emphasises some attributes and minimizes 
the importance of others.  
 
What is novel from the findings of this study is the strength of the view suggesting a 
growing realisation within the profession itself - particularly amongst women - that ‘merit is 
the problem’, and that there is no longer a consensus about how it is defined and the methods 
                                            
 
20 See eg Ruddick (1990); Gilligan (1982); Mackinnon (1989) and Fiorenza (2009).   
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used to assess it. This comes through in the high degree of scepticism found that merit would 
be rewarded in judicial appointments.  As one of the interviewees noted, ‘there is a 
meritocracy but it’s their meritocracy ... that’s a fact of life’.   
 
On one view of the findings all that might be necessary is some relatively minor re-
working of the appointment process by the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointment 
Commission. This could provide a process resulting in a more appropriate and diverse 
judiciary for the new legal space that may be emerging in post-conflict Northern Ireland, and  
this might be sufficient to counter criticism.  Such a process might involve, for example, a 
concerted effort to include more women in shortlists; an enhanced judge-shadowing scheme; 
a promotion process for incumbents in the lower to higher courts; or a drive to see more 
solicitors or public sector lawyers in the upper courts.  However, it is contended that such 
steps alone are unlikely to be sufficient.  There are a large number of challenges to the justice 
system in Northern Ireland which require a more fundamental rethinking of the kind of 
judiciary needed, and a radical re-working of the idea of 'appointment on merit'.  Further, it is 
maintained in what may seem initially as a paradoxical position, that discussions of merit in 
appointment need to be moved beyond gender precisely in order to achieve the sort of gender 
balance that is appropriate for a modern judiciary seeking the most talented judges. If we 
allow the current idea of ‘merit’ to remain unchallenged, and see the problem as only about 
how to move more women into this definition, change will be very slow, if it happens at all.   
Respondents in the focus groups may have initiated scepticism about merit, but this cannot be 
the final statement.  NIJAC, and indeed the wider system, needs to become more involved in 
defining the notion of 'merit'.  There is a real need to think beyond what might take the ‘bad 
look’ off the profile of the present bench, and to realise that any new concept of merit 
properly considering the needs of the legal system for a changing world will undoubtedly 
result in more female judges – and much more besides. 
 
As Northern Ireland  moves forward to consider how the bench should be composed in the 
new legal space established in the post Agreement Northern Ireland it is important we do not 
listen only to the voices of those who are closely involved or have a direct interest in the 
answer.  Indeed the inward looking perspectives of many respondents in the study was 
striking.  They have to a very large extent viewed ‘the problem’ from their own perspective 
(that is as individuals building careers) and with little discussion or thought directed towards 
the needs of users of the legal system or the public at large who finance much of it.  Certainly 
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although most respondents indicated that diversity would be ‘a good thing’,  the diversity 
proposed from many respondents goes only so far.  There seems to be little interest in 
appointing judges who might meet the current problems of the system directly: problems 
such as access to justice for the very large sections of the community who are losing or have 
lost the ability to utilize the court system through cost.21 A critical reader of the respondents’ 
views presented here might pose the question: what would this more diverse judiciary do to 
make the system better, fairer, cheaper, and more responsive to public need in Northern 
Ireland?  From the information obtained from respondents it would seem it would do very 
little indeed. It seems that the judicial appointments system is, in reality, trying to resolve a 
small  problem (that is female representation at the higher judicial levels) when a number of 
other larger ones which are present or becoming obvious are not being acknowledged.  If 
these wider issues were to be faced up to this may well resolve the problem of diversity 
anyway. 
 
It is important to be clear here.  There is no wish to undermine the aim that women 
should be found more frequently in judicial roles. The argument rather is that a judicial 
appointments process which looks at the wider needs of the judicial system could be the most 
effective way in which to increase diversity, because it could lead to a judiciary where the 
skill set more closely matches those of all suitable applicants - male and female - possessing 
a whole range of attributes.22  That is to say, if merit could be redefined according to external 
need (rather than conditioned by internal professional structures) then diversity would surely 
follow and the legal system might better benefit the population which it is designed to serve.    
 
This suggests that it is necessary to start thinking of the judiciary and the wider legal 
system as a public resource, and consider what the public might want or legitimately expect 
from the judiciary. It is unlikely that diversity will naturally flow from correcting particular 
under-representations in the system.  Instead in order to achieve a real diversity it is 
necessary to change the perception of the judiciary and see it as a public resource acting in 
                                            
 
21 In a way this mirrors the general reaction of much of the profession towards new funding regimes which have focused for 
the most part on how cutting legal aid will result in poorer quality representation rather than on more general issues of the 
unmet legal need.   For the wider context of legal aid in Northern Ireland and the budgetary pressures pertaining there see  
Access to Justice Review Northern Ireland: The Report (2011) and the second part of the review promised for the end of 
2015 (see further http://www.dojni.gov.uk/index/access-to-justice-2.htm ). 
22 Indeed as Joanne Conaghan has suggested, too much of a focus upon gender can not only take one’s eye off other factors, 




the wider interest and as delivering access to justice (rather than mainly reflecting the career 
development ladder within the legal professions). Paterson and Paterson’s (2012) recent 
critique of the Supreme Court appointments system echoes some of this but also makes the 
point that merit should be seen in a more broadly contextual manner, taking into account the 
needs of the court as a body acting in the public interest rather than as a group of individual 
judges chosen as ‘best’ on the day. It is important to begin to consider more closely several 
elements of the judicial task:  
• What is it that judges actually do (rather than what applicants for these posts do)? 
• What is it that users of the court system want from judges (which they might not be 
currently getting)? 
• How can judges contribute to reducing the expenditure on legal in Northern Ireland 
which currently runs at just under £2 million per week (Northern Ireland Legal 
Services Commission 2015)? 
• What are the skill sets which are actually required for the judicial task? 
• What is the role of the judge in ensuring effective case management and team work to 
deliver efficient access to justice? 
• How exactly does  it help the judicial process, or its perception, to have judges who 
are more ‘reflective’ of the broader community? 
 
There has been some growing interest in this recently.23  However much of this research has 
not attempted to test some the basic assumptions that have come to the inform the 
appointments process whereby, for example, judicial skills are equated with High Court 
advocacy experience in complex cases such as leading barristers may have developed.  The 
appointment process remains too concentrated on what an applicant has done within the 
career structure of the legal profession rather than on what he or she should be expected to do 
as a judge serving a wider interest.  
 
This is perhaps the beginning of an exciting period in judicial studies.  Researchers 
want to know much more about the roles which judges perform and how much of this 
involves the skills of technical substantive law in the traditional sense and how much the 
                                            
 
23 Other than early work such as that by Paterson (1982 and more recently in 2013) there has been only very limited research 
on the judicial role in the UK (see further  Rock (1993; Darbyshire 2011; Thomas 2013 and the work of the ULC Judicial 
Institute at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judicial-institute ).  
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resolution of relatively straightforward law and facts but with complex factors surrounding 
the wider public context. For example, in the new rights regime in Northern Ireland that 
Harvey discusses in this volume there may well be difficult issues of balancing a range of  
political  (with both  a small ‘p’ and large ‘P’)  factors  occurring within relatively 
straightforward legal contexts.  Beyond this, a judiciary that is seen as a public resource 
would be alive to the whole range of other roles and tasks which might include: case 
management and ensuring value for money; public relations and making sure that although 
parties may leave court having lost, they feel they have been heard; assisting litigants in 
person, and pursuing the various values of justice for everyone in a context of declining legal 
aid and increasing costs. The list is nearly endless, but is surely worth building our 
knowledge about its contents.  In Northern Ireland in particular, policy makers should be 
encouraging this inquiry. A most desirable side-effect will be a more diverse judiciary as well 
as perhaps a more effective one. 
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